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THE PROPOSED PRODUCT LIABILITY STATUTE IN
OHIO-ITS PURPOSE AND PROBABLE RESULTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A N INNOVATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY STATUTE was recently passed by
the Ohio Senate.1 The legislation was introduced in response to a
sharp increase in the amount and cost of product liability litigation. It is
designed to make product liability insurance for companies more readily
available and less expensive.2 Should this bill be enacted, significant
changes in Ohio product liability law will occur.
Reform is needed in this relatively new area of the law. Within the
past twenty years there has been, in both Ohio and throughout the
United States, a marked increase in the number of product liability law-
suits and the amount of damages awarded in court, or agreed upon in
settlements out of court.' The reasons for these developments appear to
include greater public awareness, which has significantly increased the
number of claims filed, a greater interest in the cause of consumerism
and the stricter standards of liability imposed by court decisions upon
manufacturers and retailers of allegedly defective products.
The increased expense of such lawsuits, which has been borne by
manufacturers and ultimately their insurers, has created calls for legis-
' S.B. No. 67, 113th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as S.B.
No. 67]. See Appendix I for text of S.B. No. 67. At the time of this writing, the
bill was pending before the Ohio House of Representatives.
' The introduction to S.B. No. 67 states that its legislative purpose is:
[To] impose on product liability actions a statute of limitations related to
the time of initial sale of the product, to make certain defenses available
in all product liability cases, to establish rebuttable presumptions in the
case of either compliance or noncompliance with manufacturing stan-
dards, to limit the liability of sellers of allegedly defective products, to
require insurance companies writing product liability insurance policies
to report annually certain information relative to such policies to the
Superintendent of Insurance, and to require insurers to base their prod-
uct liability insurance rates in this state on experience in this state.
I A typical example of the recent increase in the number of product liability
claims borne by American businesses is that of the Newman Machine Company,
which operates with the Baxter D. Whitney Company. Prior to 1967, neither
Newman nor Whitney, with more than 150 years of combined business operation,
had ever been sued. Since 1967, however, these firms have been subjected to
thirty-eight claims. Statement of Dennis R. Connolly of the American Insurance
Assoc. before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance, Comm. on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives 3 (Sept. 27, 1979)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter cited as Connolly]. Multi-million dollar
awards and settlements in product liability cases are becoming more frequent.
One commentator has cited seventeen awards in excess of one million dollars
made by one jury in a fifteen month period. Hoenig, Products Liability Problems
and Proposed Reform, 651 INS. L.J. 213, 229 (1977).
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lative reform. Such reform is urged to reduce the excesses of product
liability litigation and to make product liability insurance more available
and affordable.'
Another goal of reform is to reduce the number of claims arising from
excessively aged products.' Even though these claims represent a small
percentage of the total number of product liability actions filed, they
can result in sizeable judgments and settlements. Furthermore, with
the tendency toward legal action to remedy an injury, the number of
aged claims may substantially increase.
This note will deal with the effects of the proposed bill, Senate Bill
No. 67, on product liability law as it is now practiced in Ohio, including:
1) The types of claims the proposed legislation would preclude due to a
time lag between the date of purchase and the date of injury;' 2) the ef-
fects this proposed legislation would have upon lawsuits whose out-
comes depend upon technical applications of the various statutes of
limitations now in effect, which depend on whether the claim is based on
written or oral contract, tort, implied or express warranty, or profes-
sional malpractice;7 3) the legislation's consideration of the appropriate
status of sellers who did not manufacture the product, and the extent of
their liability in a damage suit;' 4) the available defenses provided by
Senate Bill No. 67 based upon claims that the product involved was
modified, or has deteriorated due to neglect or abuse;9 and 5) the rebut-
' See Connolly, supra note 3, at 1. "From 1962 until 1974, there were no in-
creased rate filings for product liability insurance. In 1974, 1975, and 1976, there
were substantial increased rate filings. In 1977, 1978, and 1979, rates and pre-
miums tended to stabilize. The activity in 1974 was triggered by changes in the
legal system." Id
' INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY:
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 83 (1977) [hereinafter cited as I.S.O.
SURVEY]. This national study indicated that 2.6% of the products involved in
product liability actions were purchased more than six years prior to the time of
the injury from which the lawsuit arose.
' The current statutory rule merely restricts bodily injury or personal
damage claims to those which have been brought within two years after the in-
jury occurred. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1979). To this limitation will
be added the restriction that the action not be brought more than ten years after
first being sold or leased other than when the requirements for any of the excep-
tions have been met. S.B. No. 67, supra note 1.
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.06 (contract in writing), 2305.07 (contract not
in writing), 2305.09 (certain torts), and 2305.11 (time limitations for bringing cer-
tain actions) (Page Supp. 1979). See also notes 19-22 infra and accompanying text.
6 S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.32 incorporates a number of provisions nar-
rowly defining the situations in which actions in tort may be brought against
sellers of products.
' See id- § 2305.33. The proposed legislation is similar on this point to the
common law rule of Ohio as stated in Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d
317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), and apparently completes Ohio's transition from con-
tributory negligence -where any conduct of plaintiff which helped bring about
his injury would defeat his claim-to the law of strict liability, which would re-
[Vol. 29:141
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table presumptions which the proposed legislation establishes in cases
involving products made or not made in accordance with "state of the
art" or governmental safety regulations applicable at the time of manu-
facture.10
II. BACKGROUND
A motivating factor behind this legislation is concern over the cost
and availability of product liability insurance to both manufacturers and
insurers. The concept that the cost of paying for a plaintiff's injuries
sustained from a product should be absorbed by the manufacturer as a
cost of doing business is a major factor behind the doctrine of strict lia-
bility." The manufacturer's assumption of this increased risk is reflected
in additional expenses allocated to the product due to higher products
liability insurance premiums. As to insurers, the cost of doing business
is also increased. With the advent of large damage awards, it is foresee-
able that payments to injured parties may exceed premium revenues.
Thus, the burden of paying large damage awards falls upon the insurers,
and not solely on the manufacturers who put the product on the market.
As a result, there is a substantial risk that the product liability line
may become so unprofitable for insurers that rates may have to be sub-
stantially increased and the availability of products liability insurance
curtailed. Therefore, those businesses which can least afford insurance-
the small manufacturers-will be placed in the difficult position where
they must either pay the increased premiums, or forego insurance and
assume the risk of having to pay substantial damage awards. The por-
tent for small businesses is apparent: without affordable products liabil-
ity insurance, many will operate with either severely impaired capital
due to high insurance rates, or be under the shadow of bankruptcy
should they need to satisfy a large judgment award.
A primary goal of the pending legislation is to make insurance avail-
able at reasonable cost.1" To assure that the cost and availability of this
quire plaintiff to knowingly confront the danger before recovery of damages
would be precluded. Temple literally adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965) which abolishes contractual privity and negligence requirements in
order to establish the strict liability doctrine.
10 "State of the art" has been included as a part of S.B. No. 67 § 2305.33 which
also includes the defenses of modification, deterioration, abuse, and plaintiff's
assumption of risk. The rebuttable presumptions of the product's safety, if made
in accordance with governmental safety standards, and of the product's defective-
ness, if not made within those standards, are organized into a separate section.
See S.B. No. 67 supra note 1, § 2305.34.
" The first advancement of the "spreading of'the cost" theory was made by
Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944). Justice Traynor reasoned that the manufacturer could insure against the
risk of injury and distribute the economic burden among the public as a cost of
doing business. Id at 458, 150 P.2d at 441.
12 See note 2 supra.
1980]
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insurance are based on reliable, verifiable data, a substantial portion of
the proposed product liability legislation includes requirements that in-
surance companies report the data upon which their Ohio premium
rates are based. The bill also mandates that insurance rates in Ohio be
based upon the insurer's actual business experience in Ohio.13
The Ohio proposal is but one approach in the large reform movement
in product liability law taking place throughout the country. This ap-
proach can be compared to other proposals, such as the Product Liabil-
ity Legislative Package offered by the American Insurance Association"
and selected provisions of the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law."
13 S.B. No. 67 supra note 1, § 3929.301 embodies several reporting re-
quirements which provide the state with reliable data to verify the bases upon
which insurance companies determine their premium schedules. Section 3937.021,
besides requiring that Ohio rates be based upon the companies' experiences in the
state, also creates the Ohio Products Liability Study Commission whose purpose
will be to study the effects of this legislation on product liability law in general,
with the goal of making recommendations to the legislature about possible revi-
sions in Ohio product liability law. See Appendix I.
11 AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE
PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS AND ADMINISTRATION
OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW (revised March, 1977). This package deals with seven
proposals (the first five will be considered in this note): 1) Statute of Limitations;
2) Product Modification and Alteration; 3) State of the Art Defenses; 4) Subse-
quent Repairs and Improvements; 5) Duty to Warn; 6) Punitive Damages; and 7)
Workers' Compensation. According to the package's overview,
[T]hese reforms do not purport to make any major breaks with the com-
mon law tradition of torts litigation. They do not envision the introduc-
tion of an alternative scheme of accident compensation, such as work-
men's compensation or automobile no-fault insurance, but instead
assume that individual cases will be tried before juries in the usual com-
mon law way. Likewise the package is by no means comprehensive, as
there are several major problem areas in product liability law which
these ... statutes do not directly address.
The Association further acknowledges that:
[t]he statutes here will create unfortunate results in individual cases;
yet there is reason to believe that the emerging case law is also produc-
tive of greater injustices. Ideally, a more sensitive judical [sic] approach
could provide the best solution, but failing that, the errors created by
these statutes seem to be of a lesser magnitude than the errors that are
eliminated.
A comparison will be made between these statutory proposals and S.B. No. 67.
15 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Law]. The Draft Uniform Product Liability Law was written for the Depart-
ment of Commerce. After public comments are obtained and revisions are made,
it will be published as a model law for use by the states. The findings upon which
the law was written include:
[Siharply rising product liability insurance premiums'have created
serious problems in interstate commerce resulting in: 1) Increased prices
of consumer and industrial products; 2) Disincentives to develop high-
risk but potentially beneficial products; 3) Businesses going without
product liability insurance coverage, thus jeopardizing the availability of
[Vol. 29:141
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Legislatures in many states face the problem of suits brought because
of injuries sustained from products manufactured in a world of changing
technological principles and safety standards. One result of this reform
movement has been to exacerbate a condition which has existed for
many years; the wide disparity in legal principles which govern the out-
come of product liability lawsuits depending upon the jurisdiction in
which they are brought. Recently enacted product liability legislation
has widened already existing differences among state laws." Particu-
larly in product liability law, where the injury sustained may be perma-
nently disabling, it seems incongruous that the outcome of a suit should
depend upon where it is brought.
The similarities and differences between the Ohio product liability
legislation and applicable provisions of the Draft Uniform Product Lia-
bility Law will be discussed in an attempt to determine whether the
Ohio legislation shares the spirit of uniformity behind the Department
of Commerce's proposal. Many other states have reformed their laws on
product liability or are in the process of doing so. The laws of some of
these states will also be compared with the proposed Ohio legislation,
particularly as they relate to the statute of limitations, perhaps one of
the most important features of Senate Bill No. 67."
There is a great deal of controversy because of inherent conflicts be-
tween the goals and interests of the insurance industry, manufacturers,
and plaintiffs. A comparison of the present Ohio product law with the
experience of other "reform" states and with the proposed Ohio legisla-
tion will be attempted. This evaluation can then provide insight into the
possible effects the legislation could have on product liability actions.
III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Generally
There are presently six sections of the Ohio Revised Code defining
the applicable statutes of limitation. There are sections for actions
compensation to injured persons; and 4) Panic "reform" efforts that
would unreasonably curtail the rights of product users.
Id at 2,997. Selected portions of the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law can be
found in Appendix II.
16 See id. at 2,997 § 101(f). Section 101(f) notes these disparities and suggests
the model law as the remedy to be adopted by the states.
17 The statutes of limitations of Connecticut, Florida, Oregon and Utah will be
highlighted for comparison purposes.
18 S.B. No. 67 § 2305.101 provides:
(A) An action for bodily injury, death, or injury to personal or real
property caused by a defective product shall be brought within two
years after the cause thereof arose, but in no event more than ten years
from the date the product was first sold or leased for use or consumption
if the cause of action is based upon strict tort liability or implied war-
ranty except as otherwise provided in this section. If the manufacturer
19801
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sounding in contract, whether written19 or oral," a section governing ac-
tions for injury to body or personal property21 and a section providing
time limitations for bringing certain actions based on other grounds
such as libel, slander, assault or malpractice.'
The interplay of these various statutes of limitations can result in a
great deal of confusion when the product liability claim is based upon
more than one cause of action. 23 Frequently the courts must evaluate
and define the nature of the lawsuit before deciding which statute of
limitations applies.
The results of this procedure often appear to be incongruous. 4 Ac-
cordingly, one goal of the proposed legislation is to de-emphasize the
of a defective product, at the time such defective product was manufac-
tured, had actual knowledge of the defect and that such defect is likely
to cause harm in the ordinary course of the use of the product, then the
ten-year limitation set forth in this section shall not apply to an action
for bodily injury, death, or injury to personal or real property resulting
from such defect. Neither shall the ten-year limitation apply to any such
action or cause resulting from exposure to toxic substances.
(B) Nothing contained in this section affects the right of any person
found liable to seek and obtain indemnity from any other person.
S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101.
19 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (Page Supp. 1979) (sets a period of fifteen
years within which such an action may be brought).
Id. § 2305.07 (Page Supp. 1979) (permits six years in which to bring an ac-
tion based upon a contract not in writing).
21 Id. § 2305.10 (Page 1979). This section, expected to be the section most af-
fected by S.B. No. 67, states that "[an action for bodily injury or injuring per-
sonal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose."
Id. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1979) (sets a limit of either one or two years, de-
pending upon the nature of the action brought). Id. § 2305.131 sets a limitation of
ten years, after which suits against architects and engineers for injuries sustained
from defects in design to improvements upon real property will be barred.
3 In Adcor Realty Corp. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 450 F. Supp. 769,770 (N.D.
Ohio 1978), the court listed three possible causes of action in product liability
claims: 1) an action in tort grounded upon negligence; 2) a cause of action based
upon contract; 3) an action in tort based upon breach of duty assumed by the
manufacturer-seller of a product. The listing above is by no means exhaustive.
For example, the doctrine of strict liability was not even mentioned. The case,
however, provides a good example of the complexities which federal and state
courts in Ohio face when deciding statute of limitation issues.
14 See Farbach Chemical Co. v. Commercial Chemical Co., 101 Ohio App. 209,
136 N.E.2d 363 (1956). In Farbach, the court stated that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.10 (Page 1979) "providing that an action for injury to personal property shall
be brought within two years after the cause of action thereof arose, governs all
actions the real purpose of which is to recover damages for injury to personal
property and losses incident thereto, and it makes no difference whether such ac-
tion is for a breach of contract or strictly in tort." Farbach Chemical Co. v. Com-
mercial Chemical Co., 101 Ohio App. at 211 (quoting Andrianos v. Community
Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 47, 97 N.E.2d 549, 549 (1951)). But see OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1979); id. §§ 2305.06, .07, .11, .131 (Page Supp. 1979) (set-
ting out statutes of limitation for various actions); note 19-22 supra and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 29:141
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sharp distinctions among the different statutes of limitation under
which a product liability claim can be brought. Most of these suits would
be subject to the bill's provisions, thus permitting the merits of each ac-
tion to be reached or barred without resort to subtle theoretical distinc-
tions.
The length of time imposed by the statute of limitations has become
the most controversial facet of this legislation. Whereas the present
Ohio Revised Code section 2305.10 merely requires an action be brought
within two years after the cause arose," proposed section 2305.101 adds
the additional requirement that if the action is based on strict liability
or implied warranty, it must be brought within ten years from the date
the product was first sold or leased for use or consumption." Thus, in
order to avoid this date of sale provision, the plaintiff must prove the
defendant's "actual knowledge of the defect" and knowledge that "such
defect is likely to cause harm in the ordinary course of the use of the
product."" Even construing the date of sale as to the date the product
was sold by the merchant to the consumer rather than the sale by the
manufacturer to the merchant, thereby protracting the "outside limita-
tion period,"28 this still results in a stringent requirement.
Much has been written about statutes of limitation which run from
the date of sale of the product. The insurance industry strongly sup-
ports such a proposal. 9 Furthermore, manufacturers might argue that
25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1979). Section 2305.10 refers to what
is known as the "inside limitation period." This permits an action to be brought if
it is within two years of the injury sustained, no matter when the product which
caused the injury was made or sold.
Compare S.B. No. 67 supra note 1, § 2305.101 with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.06 (Page Supp. 1979). This proposal is known as the "outside limitation
period," which is at the core of the controversy surrounding S.B. No. 67. It means
that ten years after the date of initial sale or lease for use or consumption of the
product, no action based upon strict liability or implied warranty will be heard
absent a showing of scienter on the part of the manufacturer.
" S.B. No. 67 supra note 1, § 2305.101.
28 See note 26 supra.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE
PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS: AND ADMINISTRATION
OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 6-8 (revised March, 1977). The package lists four
reasons in support of a statute of limitations to bar aged product liability claims.
First, the statute will function mainly in those cases in which the defendant is apt
to have a good defense to the plaintiff's cause of action on the merits, such as in-
tervening alteration of modification. Additionally, it will apply most often to
cases involving capital goods or industrial equipment and only rarely to consumer
or household goods. Second, the proposed statute of limitations would not block
the deserving plaintiff from some other remedy via tort law or workmen's com-
pensation. Third, barring remote causes of action eliminates the need to evaluate
evidence that has grown stale and unreliable over time. Finally, the statute pro-
tects the ability of defendants to rely upon standards of liability applicable when
the products were first placed on the market instead of subjecting them to suit
on the strength of legal doctrines emerging only a long time thereafter. See also
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
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there is a need for products that have a long useful life in order to avoid
the frequent purchase of replacement machinery at skyrocketing prices
despite continual improvements in technology and safety features.
Many businesses simply could not function without older, durable prod-
ucts. It is feared that permitting product liability lawsuits alleging
defects in design of machinery made years ago can have the counterpro-
ductive effect of discouraging the production of high-quality machinery
with a lengthy productive life, in favor of less durable goods which will
need relatively rapid replacement."0
The feared occurrence of product liability suits based on aged prod-
ucts has become a reality throughout the country." Although the ex-
tremes observed in other states have rarely occurred in Ohio, there
have been actions maintained for injuries sustained from allegedly
defective products which would have been barred had the proposed
statute of limitations been in effect.
32
The filing of suits for injuries sustained from products long after their
manufacture or initial sale has other potentially prejudicial effects. For
tactical reasons, plaintiff's attorneys often delay the filing of suits until
just before the statute of limitations has expired. Particularly in urban
areas where the court docket is crowded and calendar delays are fre-
quent and lengthy, a trial could eventually be held on a claim filed alleg-
ing a defect in a product manufactured possibly before some of the fact-
finders were born.
These tactics frequently result in unjust burdens being placed upon
the defendant. Not only does a significant lapse in time tend to create
gaps in evidence, but there is also the problem of trying product liabil-
ity cases on "hindsight"; i.e., using technological and safety standards
which were developed after the product in question was made.
Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1975) (product
warnings issued in 1957 were judged by aggressive application of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 standards on duty to warn published in 1965).
' See Hoenig, A Statute of Repose?, 179 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1978), at 1, col. 1.
", See, e.g., Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1974) (twenty-
four year old tractor was alleged to be defective because it was designed without
roll bar or seat belts): Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th
Cir. 1973) (claim that a seventeen year old van was defectively designed because
an eleven year old non-user severed her finger in the vent of the parked vehicle);
Wittkamp v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (injury sustained
from fifty year old rifle); Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 111
(D. Md. 1969) (claim that seventeen year old bus was defective because it had no
rear-view mirror on right side); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37
N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975) (centrifuge laundry extractor
sold in 1948 and causing the injury in 1969).
32 See Burns v. Pennsylvania Rubber & Supply Co., 117 Ohio App. 12, 189
N.E.2d 645 (1961) (twelve years of use between the date of sale and the date of
explosion, without accident, did not require the trial court to direct a verdict for
the retailer and thereby decide the question of proximate cause).
[Vol. 29:141
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Theoretically jury instructions could correct this problem, but prac-
tically it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the jurors from
using their own personal experience to evaluate the validity of the issue
before them. For example, how would the average juror evaluate the
defectiveness of a lawnmower made in 1950 when the only lawnmower
he has owned was made after 1975 and thereby subject to present
developments in technology and safety standards? No matter what in-
structions the judge provides the juror will tend to evaluate the thirty-
year old machine against his five-year old product. As stated by a noted
commentator:
This would especially penalize the manufacturers and sellers of
durable products whose quality permits them to remain de-
sirable and useful for long periods of time. When the product is
already ten or fifteen years old at the time of injury, the jury
will later determine the design or manufacturing propriety of an
ancient product in terms of the pace of modern space-age tech-
nology. Because jurors today are used to newer and safer prod-
ucts which are often subject to governmental safety standards,
they may easily be receptive to claims that the older design was
defective, particularly when a financially responsible or "target"
defendant is sued and a severe injury evokes sympathy.'
Without reform, the end result may be a tendency to make products
less durable so they will not last long enough to become the focus of a
product liability claim filed many years after the product's manufacture.
The proposed legislation would provide this "outside limitation period"
to decrease the number of product liability claims based on aged prod-
ucts.' Without this provision the number of product based claims will
.continue to accelerate. This in turn will cause an increase in insurance
premiums to retailers and manufacturers, thus making such insurance
even more difficult to obtain and with the potential for driving small
businesses from the marketplace. Also, the burden on the consumer to
pay ever-increasing prices for products which may not be designed to
last as long as they could is similarly unjustified. Strong public policies,
it seems, support a restrictive statute of limitations."5
8 Hoenig, supra note 30, at 3, cols. 1-2.
See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974).
The court recognized the policy arguments behind such a statute of limitations:
In general, there are usually two reasons which are advanced as justifi-
cation for the imposition of such statutes. The first concerns the lack of
reliability and availability of evidence after a lapse of long periods of
time....
The second rationale concerns the public policy of allowing people, after
the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a degree of cer-
tainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown
potential liability. ... 9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
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B. The Exceptions
The proposed statute of limitations has two exceptions which would
prevent its application to specific product liability claims. The first oc-
curs when the manufacturer of a defective product at the time of its
manufacture had actual knowledge of the defect and that such defect
would be likely to cause harm in the ordinary course of the product's
use.36 The other occurs when the action arose due to an injury resulting
from exposure to toxic substances.
The first exception, often considered as an issue of fraudulent conceal-
ment, is a recognized tolling provision which is commonly built into such
laws. It is a reasonable exception; it is fundamentally unfair to enable
an individual to escape liability by fraudulently concealing his knowl-
edge of the defect.
The second exception in the proposed statute was apparently included
because of difficulties presented in cases involving injuries resulting
from exposure to poisons. The problem was to set a "date of injury"
from which the statute of limitations could run. There appears to be
significant common law precedent for the proposition that:
[Wihere it was shown that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the
product's defect or of its unforeseen effect because the results of
using the product were gradual and unaccompanied by actual or
perceptible trauma which would lead to recognition of the causal
connection between the product and the injury suffered, the
statute of limitations would not begin to run on the action until
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the connection. 9
These rationales are obviously applicable without regard to whether or
not undetected damage had occurred at the time of the original negli-
gence....
Id at 697, 530 P.2d at 56.
3 S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101(A).
T Id
See Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 991, 1001 (1979):
[WIhere it was shown that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the product's
defect or unforeseen effect because of justifiable reliance on the manu-
facturer's false representation of the product's safety and fitness, or
because of the manufacturer's fraudulent concealment of the product's
defect, the statute of limitations would not begin to run on the action un-
til the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the misrepresen-
tation or the fraudulent concealment.
See also Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 315, 114 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1974) (defects in airplane's fuel system fraudulently concealed by manufacturer);
Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969)
(ingestion of drug caused bodily ailments during pregnancy and plaintiff relied on
company's express representation of safety).
" Annot., 91 A.L.R. 3d 991, 999 (1979). This type of "tolling" of the statute of
limitations applies to injuries involving cumulative exposure to toxic substances.
See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 556
[Vol. 29:141
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The increasing complexity and sophistication of the chemicals indus-
try provides adequate reason for this exception to be built into Senate
Bill No. 67. The problems inherent in ascertaining a date of injury upon
which to base a products liability claim were illustrated in a case involv-
ing a plaintiff's use of a chloroquine derivative.' ° Plaintiff began using
the derivative in 1953 to treat a skin disorder. Plaintiff first noticed an
eye problem in 1956. When she visited an ophthalmologist in 1962, she
was found to be losing her eyesight from side effects of the chloroquine
derivatives. By 1969, the plaintiff was almost totally blind.
There are many products whose continuous use results in an accumu-
lation of insults to the body with resultant disease. Exposure to
asbestos and figerglass have resulted in such illnesses as asbestosis and
beryliosis which do not appear until many years after the initial con-
tamination." Thus, there is ample justification for the exceptions to the
statute for injuries involving toxic substances.42
F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1977) (cause of action did not accrue for plaintiff's blindness un-
til she learned of blindness caused to another person through use of the same
drug and concluded that there might be a causal connection between her blind-
ness and the defendant's drug); Newcomer v. Searle & Co., 378 F. Supp. 1154
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (explaining that the rule in personal injury actions was that the
statute did not begin to run until discovery of the cause of the harm or the time
when the cause of the harm should have been discovered); Wiggington v.
Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971) (plaintiff's
cause of action accrued at the time he discovered that his illness resulted from
exposure to chemical products even though discovery occurred three years after
his last exposure to them).
40 Basco v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). Chloroquine had
resulted in many similar injuries. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1968);
Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
41 See, e.g., Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (exposure to asbestos); Arnstein v. Manu-
facturing Chemists Ass'n, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (exposure to vinyl
chloride). Diagnoses of such illnesses after exposure to these and other chemicals
can be extremely difficult. Symptoms may not appear until many years after ex-
posure with no intervening illnesses to suggest the cause of an ultimately, debili-
tating disease. It is not uncommon for signs of asbestosis and other similar ill-
nesses to develop twenty years or more after exposure.
4 A number of other possible exceptions were not included in the legislation.
The concept that a manufacturer has a continuing duty to either correct the
defective condition or warn the purchaser of the defect has been recognized as a
basis to toll a statute of limitations when evidence of the continuing duty is intro-
duced. See, e.g., Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 365 A.2d 1180
(1976) (suit based on continuing duty to warn may not be brought in strict liabil-
ity under statute of limitations). There are also tolling exceptions such as infancy,
mental or physical disability, and absence of a defendant from the jurisdiction. By
excluding these tolling provisions from the proposed legislation, common law
development of these exceptions could be precluded and prejudice rendered upon
those plaintiffs least able to bear them. See generally, Developments in the Law
-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1220-32 (1950) for a complete
discussion of tolling provisions includable in statutes of limitations.
1980]
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C. Right to Seek Indemnity
Section 2305.101(B) of Senate Bill No. 67 apparently will not effect the
present relationship between the defendant ultimately found liable, and
the insurer who must pay the claim. 3 No additional defenses are made
available to the insurer beyond those he already has against indemnify-
ing the manufacturer for injuries sustained from defective products.
The legislation also would not have an effect on the manufacturer's
right to bring an action against one who was responsible in part for the
injury-causing defect, such as the supplier who made the defective part
for the manufacturer's product.
D. Senate Bill No. 67 v. Draft Uniform Product
Liability Law § 109
There are interesting contrasts to be noted between the proposed
legislation and section 109 of the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law."
For the most part, Ohio's proposed product liability legislation is based
upon an entirely different concept than that which forms the foundation
of the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law. Whereas both section 109
of the model law and Senate Bill No. 67 seeks to provide the manufac-
turer (who is termed the "seller" in section 109) with some protection
from "stale" claims, section 109 also seeks to provide the plaintiff with
the right to seek damages for injuries sustained from defective products
in situations in which Ohio's legislation would leave the plaintiff sub-
stantially without a remedy against the manufacturer.
Section 109 accomplishes this in two distinct ways. First, it utilizes
the concept of "useful safe life," i.e., the principle that "[the] age of an
allegedly defective product must be considered in light of its expected
useful life and the stress to which it has been subjected."" Through this
concept, a seller may be held liable only for harms caused during the
"useful safe life" of the product. It does not attempt to apply fixed use-
ful life standards for all products. This may result in a less clear stan-
dard than that set by the fixed statute of limitations proposed in Ohio,
but the section 109 standard is far less arbitrary. Second, the ten-year
statute of repose is divided into workplace injuries and non-workplace
injuries. No such distinction is made in Senate Bill No. 67 with the possi-
ble result that an employee injured on the job by defective machinery
designed to last many years could be barred from obtaining legal re-
" See S.B. No. 67 supra note 1, § 2305.101(B).
" Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 109, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 2,999 (1979).
The text of section 109 is reprinted in Appendix II along with other selected por-
tions of the model law.
" Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 330, 319 A.2d 914, 923
(1974) (brake-locking mechanism on a crane failed after more than twenty years
of use).
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dress. Section 109 permits the plaintiff to bring an action against the
employer outside the ten-year statute of repose if the worker can prove
the danger of the product. For non-workplace injuries section 109 does
not contain an absolute cut-off, but instead creates the rebuttable pre-
sumption that the product has been used beyond its normal life."6
The exceptions to section 109 are similar to those of Senate Bill No.
67. Both statutes provide for an exception where the manufacturer ex-
pressly warrants that his product will function beyond the ten-year
period.' 7 They also provide for exceptions where the seller (manufac-
turer) has intentionally misrepresented his product. 8 In addition,
neither statute affects contribution and indemnity claims,"9 and each ex-
cepts products from which injuries may arise only after continual ex-
posure." The "inside limitation period" of section 109(C) is considerably
more liberal with three years being permitted after the injury before an
action may be filed, rather than the time requirement of two years
specified in the Ohio proposal.51
It is apparent that despite the similarities in these proposals, there
are substantial differences. These differences are grounded in funda-
mental philosophical bases which cannot be totally reconciled. Section
109 is a model statute for all the states and is thus more complex than
section 2305.101 and probably more difficult to administer. The model
statute makes a greater attempt to allow for the different circum-
stances in which a plaintiff may find himself and which would color a
particular product liability case. For this reason the model statute is
less prone to criticism upon the grounds of arbitrariness and lack of a
rational basis.
Ohio is not the only state concerned with altering statute of limita-
46 Colorado law utilizes this rebuttable presumption concept rather than the
absolute cutoff. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1978). The proposed
Ohio legislation and most other state product liability statutes use the cutoff ap-
proach. This raises questions of undue arbitrariness. See notes 57-67 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of possible constitutional challenges.
" Compare Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 109(B)(3)(a), 44 Fed. Reg.
2,996, 3,000 (1979) with S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101(A). See appendices I
and II.
8 Compare Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 109(B)(3)(b), 44 Fed. Reg.
2,996, 3,000 (1979) with S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101(A). See appendices I
and II.
49 Compare Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 109(B)(3)(c), 44 Fed. Reg.
2,996, 3,000 (1979) with S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101(B). See appendices I
and II.
' Compare Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 109(B)(3)(d), 44 Fed. Reg.
2,996, 3,000 (1979) with S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101(A). See appendices I
and II.
"' Compare Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 109(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996,
3,000 with S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.101(A). See appendices I and II.
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tions legislation. Many states have already enacted similar statutes.2
These statutes represent a broad range of approaches. Other than the
use of a rebuttable presumption (as written into Colorado law"3 and the
Draft Uniform Product Liability Law)" several states use an "outside
limitation period" either alone or in conjunction with an inside limita-
tion period. The movement toward reform utilizes the "outside limita-
tion period" as a pivotal part of the legislation. Present law in Ohio and
other states which have not amended their laws in this area apply only
the inside limitation period, i.e., as long as the injury complained of oc-
curs within a certain period of time (usually two or three years) before
the action is filed, the claim will be actionable, irrespective of the age of
the product which caused the injury. The outside limitation used by the
reform states usually varies from six to twelve years, and the point
from which the statute of limitations begins to run can be from the date
of sale, lease, bailment, or delivery of the product." In comparison with
the general tenor of the reform statutes adopted by other states,5
Senate Bill No. 67 is reasonably typical in its outlook and application.
E. Effect of Senate Bill No. 67 on Ohio Law
While a complete prognosis as to what effect this legislation will have
an Ohio product liability law is not possible, some general trends can be
suggested.
First, it is unlikely that a significant proportion of product liability
lawsuits in Ohio would be barred by the proposed statute of limitations.
A recent survey conducted by the Insurance Services Office resulted in
the finding that only 2.6 per cent of the products involved in product lia-
bility actions were purchased more than six years prior to the injury-
52 Variations among the state statutes of limitation are as great as the num-
ber of states which have enacted them. Connecticut adopted a three year inside
limitation period and allows eight years within which an action may be brought
from "the date of sale, lease or bailment" of an injury-causing defective product.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a) (West Supp. 1979). Florida's statute allows a
twelve year period "after the date of delivery of the completed product to its
original purchaser . . ." within which such an action must be commenced. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1978). Oregon shares Connecticut's outside
limitation period of eight years but bars commencement of an action "later than
two years after the date on which the death, injury or damage complained of oc-
curs." OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1977). Utah distinguishes between the date of
initial purchase and the date of manufacture permitting no action to be brought
more than six years after the sale or ten years after the product was made. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1978). See note 46 supra and accom-
panying text.
' Draft Uniform Product Liability Law 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
' See note 52 supra.
I See notes 52 and 53 supra.
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causing event. 7 Although there has been a few actions involving older
products in Ohio, 8 and there are many products made today-such as
ammunition, nails and aircraft-which are likely to have a useful life
span or shelf life of greater than ten years, 9 many actions involving
older products could be brought against defendants under whose control
the product was used, such as the plaintiff's employer who owned the
aged drill press, or the airline which owned the aged aircraft. Such ac-
tions against non-manufacturing defendants would further reduce the
number of deserving plaintiffs barred from recovery.
Second, the proposed legislation may affect the availability and cost
of product liability insurance. The underwriters' concern about potential
losses associated with older products is an important factor in determin-
ing whether such coverage will be available and at what price. Since in-
surance companies must set their present rates based upon possible
future losses, what may be of greatest import is not what is happening
today in product liability actions, but what the insurance industry per-
ceives as a portent for tomorrow." Based upon present law in Ohio, and
most other states, the theoretical multi-million dollar claim for injuries
sustained from an electric drill or heating pad manufactured decades
ago is still possible. While it cannot be postively stated that insurance
rates will moderate and coverage will become more widely available if
the proposed statute of limitations is enacted, it can be implied that this
will be so.
F. Constitutional Considerations
There may be constitutional difficulties in setting some arbitrary
time, such as ten years, after which a plaintiff would be prevented from
suing the manufacturer of a defective product. Under present Ohio law,
a suit must be filed within two years after the injury-causing event. The
5' I.S.O. SURVEY, supra note 5, at 83.
' See, e.g., Burns v. Pennsylvania Rubber & Supply Co., 117 Ohio App. 12,
189 N.E.2d 645 (1961) (hydraulic lift caused injury twelve years after purchase).
" The average age of a Boeing 707, for example, is ten years. CENSUS OF U.S.
CIVIL AIRCRAFT-1974, U.S. Government Printing Office, No. 050-007-00303-0.
' See Connolly, supra note 3, at 5-6:
To an insurance company, the evolutionary process of the liability sys-
tem presents extreme difficulties. It must calculate its premium upon
the anticipation of what will occur in the future. It receives its payment
today and pays its losses tomorrow. In the area of product liability,
there is no option by which the insurer may recover losses which have
exceeded the premiums collected in past years.
The purpose of underwriting is to select risks which in the aggregate
will hopefully produce a reasonable underwriting profit for the in-
surance company. This profit is a must if insurance companies are to con-
tinue to provide and finance the needed capacity to insure product liabil-
ity risks.
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present statute is not constitutionally infirm because it first requires an
injury before the time begins to run. The potential difficulty with
Senate Bill No. 67 is that no injury is required for the statute of limita-
tions to run; once a product reaches ten years of age, the right to sue
the manufacturer for injuries sustained from the product, is in most in-
stances terminated. The proposed legislation may extinguish a right
before the injury giving rise to a violation of that right occurs.
Several provisions of the Constitution of Ohio and the United States
Constitution may be invoked in attacking the validity of such statutes of
limitations, particularly the due process and equal protection provisions. 1
In order to uphold such statutes, the existence of legitimate legislative
purposes may need to be shown. Even assuming that the legislative pur-
poses behind this legislation-to discourage stale product liability
claims and make product liability insurance more available and afford-
able-are valid, there may be an unconstitutional distinction made in
the statute between two classes of plaintiffs based upon the ten-year
cutoff point. The situation may arise in which two plaintiffs are injured
by two similarly defective products; the first plaintiff is injured 9 years
and 11 months-after the product was sold, and the second is injured 10
years after the product was sold. Under Senate Bill No. 67, the first
plaintiff could recover for damages, whereas the second could not. This
distinction would not be made according to when the injury occurred
but when the product was made. The second plaintiff would have his
cause of action extinguished before the right to enforce it accrued, due
to an arbitrary cutoff point.
Under the doctrine of equal protection, such a classification would be
constitutional only if it was based "upon some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation ... "'
Although this "substantial relation" standard is relatively new, there is
no indication that the courts would necessarily resort to it. Instead the
statute of limitations could be evaluated using the more traditional mini-
mum rationality standard; that standard only requires a finding that
there be a rational connection between the classification and the state
interest to be protected."3 Using this standard, a court could readily con-
clude that the statute of limitations would operate to prevent stale
claims and reduce the burden on product liability insurers and thereby
uphold the constitutionality of the statute.
In assessing which equal protection analysis would be used to deter-
mine the validity of the statute of limitation provisions, it is noteworthy
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. Section 16 of the
Ohio Constitution states: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an in-
jury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay."
62 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
63 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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that the "substantial relation" standard was used by the Supreme Court
of Idaho in Jones v. State Board of Medicine" to determine the validity
of the limiting provisions of a medical malpractice statute. This statute
operated similarly to the limiting provisions of the proposed statute of
limitations for product liability actions. In determining that the "sub-
stantial relation" test applied, the court stated that "where the discrimi-
natory character of a challenged statutory classification is apparent on
its face and where there is also a patent indication of a lack of relation-
ship between the classification and the declared purpose of the statute,
then a more stringent judicial inquiry is required beyond that mandated
by [the minimum rationality test] .. .""e If the "substantial relation"
test were to be used, it is apparent that the proponents of the limitation
period would have to substantiate their arguments. Data would have to be
presented proving that the increased costs of maintaining a product
liability line is due to large damage awards in suits brought for injuries
sustained from aged products. Alternatively, proof that such suits are
likely to increase in the near future to the point where providing product
liability insurance may cease to be profitable could be presented. Pro-
ponents would also need to establish that such a statute of limitation
would serve to stem the rising costs of product liability insurance at the
relatively minor cost of preventing a few plaintiffs from obtaining judicial
relief. Whether such a showing could be made to justify upholding the
statute of limitations under the "substantial relation" doctrine is still
open to conjecture.
6 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). This case
caused the Idaho Supreme Court to examine a statute which limited the maxi-
mum amount of damages permissible in a medical malpractice case to $150,000.
The court held that denying full recovery to plaintiff injured in excess of $150,000
violated equal protection unless on remand it could be shown that: 1) a medical
malpractice crisis existed; and 2) limiting recovery of $150,000 per claim bore a
fair and substantial relation to averting that crisis. Id. at 876, 555 P.2d at 416.
Similarly, an Ohio court could uphold the constitutionality of the proposed legisla-
tion upon a showing that: 1) a product liability crisis exists which threatens the cost
and availability of product liability insurance; and 2) by enacting a statute of
limitations, including an outside limitation period of ten years, stale claims would
be prevented, thereby making insurance more available and less costly for the in-
demnification of current claims.
65 I& at 871, 555 P.2d at 411.
" See generally Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Im-
munity for Product Suppliers, 656 INS. L.J. 535 (1977):
In testing the constitutionality of the Model Bill [Draft Uniform Product
Liability Law, 44 F-d. Reg. 2996 (1979)), it is helpful to note that statutes
of limitations similar to the Model Bill have been enacted to benefit
architects and engineers engaged in designing or building structures on
real property [as in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page 1979)]. The
design statutes of limitations run from the time of substantial comple-
tion of the project and have limitations ranging from three to twenty
years.
Of course, the structures designed by architects are, almost without ex-
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A possible source of evidence lies in examining how product liability
lawsuits have changed in those states which have enacted new statutes of
limitation periods; however in most states there has not been suf-
ficient opportunity to test it."7 As a result, a complete picture cannot be
obtained regarding the judicial interpretation being given these acts.
Only two cases have been decided to date which directly involved
questions regarding the validity of such statutes. Both cases were de-
cided in Florida under a twelve-year statute of limitations based on the
original date of delivery of the comleted product to its original pur-
chaser."8 In Bauld v. J. A. Jones Construction Co., 9 the Supreme Court
of Florida upheld the statute as within the legislative authority to
devise. The court noted "[there] is no vested right in a litigant to the
benefit of the statute of limitations in effect when his cause of action ac-
crues,"70 and that the one year grace period before the statute would
take full effect was sufficient protection in adopting an outside date of
delivery statute of limitations. In another Florida case, Diamond v. E. R.
Squibb and Sons, Inc. ,1 the court again upheld the new statute of limita-
tions. The court found that where an action was not brought within
twelve years after the last date of delivery of the drug, the action was
barred by the statute of limitations regardless of when the defect in the
drug should have been discovered. 2
The "substantial relation" requirement was used by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Jones apparently because the statute involved set a maximum
ception, of a more lasting nature than manufactured goods. Yet, even
though a limiting period running from the date of completion of real
estate might seem more appropriate in design professional cases, five
courts have held these statutes of immunity for design professionals un-
constitutional as violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the United States and State Constitutions. Plant v. R.L. Reid,
Inc., 313 So. 2d 518 (Ala. 1975); Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii
1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. 1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497
S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Kallas Millwork v. Square D. Co., 225 N.W.2d 454
(Wis. 1975).
On the other hand, there have been a number of courts that have held
that design immunity statutes are constitutional. See, for example,
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972); and Smith
v. Allen Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974).
Id. at 546. The better view at present appears to be that the legislature is enti-
tled to make such policy judgments without the risk of having the legislation
declared to be unconstitutional.
67 See note 52 supra. For example, Connecticut's law did not become effective
until June 4, 1976; Florida's outside limitation statute became effective on May
23, 1977; Oregon's statute took effect on January 1, 1978; and the statute of limi-
tations in Utah became effective on May 10, 1977.
" See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1978).
69 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
70 Id. at 403.
" 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
72 Id. at 1222.
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damages amount. The case, therefore is distinguishable and does not
provide solid precedent striking down an outside date-of-sale statute of
limitations.
While sufficient litigation has not yet developed to indicate how the
courts will treat these statutes, the Florida cases suggest that such
legislation would be upheld.
IV. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS MAINTAINED AGAINST
A SELLER WHO IS NOT A MANUFACTURER
Section 2305.32 of Senate Bill No. 67 makes a number of changes in
the present law of Ohio regarding the liability of a non-manufacturing
seller. Cases in Ohio and other states generally hold manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sellers liable for injuries sustained from defective
products (particularly foodstuffs and medicines).
"Sellers" has been defined to include suppliers, lessors, donors,
bailors and lenders. 5 A possible rationale behind extending liability to
non-manufacturing sellers is that they would be encouraged to pressure
manufacturers to produce safer and better-designed products. In addi-
tion the cost of a damage award for injuries sustained from a defective
product could be more easily borne if retailers and manufacturers would
share the expenses involved.
There are countervailing considerations. For example, it is difficult to
imagine that a small independent retailer could have a substantial influ-
ence on a national manufacturer. Also, it seems unfair that the retailer
should share the expense of litigation because he sold a product which
may have been sealed in a package and thereby was denied a reasonable
opportunity to inspect. The proposed Ohio legislation seems to accept
this viewpoint.
There are significant differences between the proposed legislation in
Ohio and the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law regarding the poten-
tial liability of non-manufacturing sellers." The statute proposed in the
" See S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.32.
" See, e.g., Allison Steel Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 20
Ariz. App. 185, 511 P.2d 198 (1973), aff'd, 112 Ariz. 403, 542 P.2d 1102 (1975) (doc-
trine of strict product liability applies to all of those in chain of placing a product
in stream of commerce; from retailer, to wholesaler, to manufacturer of product);
Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976) (retailer's
liability for injuries caused by defects in product it sells is coextensive with that
of manufacturer of product).
" See generally Lockett v. General Electric Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa.
1974); aff'd sub nom., General Electric Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 511
F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Wolfe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643,
56 N.E.2d 230 (1944); Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432. 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938);
Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936).
76 Compare Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, § 114,44 Fed. Reg. 2,996,
3,001 (1979) with S.B. No. 67, supra note 1 § 2305.32. See appendices I and II.
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Draft Uniform Product Liability Law is simpler and less comprehensive.
It also would shield the non-manufacturing seller to a greater degree
than would the proposed legislation in Ohio. The Draft would permit im-
position of liability only when the seller makes an express warranty to
the contrary, or in the event of seller's negligence. For example when a
reasonable opportunity to inspect the product is not properly utilized.
On the other hand, the Ohio legislation specifically permits actions to be
maintained against the seller for negligence and for violation of express
warranty. Section 2305.32 also permits the seller to be sued if the seller
and manufacturer are substantially the same, or if there is common
ownership between seller and manufacturer, or if the seller utilizes his
own label, trademark, or product design, or if he knew or should have
known of the defect, or modifies the product thereby rendering it defec-
tive.77 The proposed statute also includes, for what appears to be purely
policy reasons, an obligation that sellers must timely divulge names and
addresses of manufacturers of the products they sell, or risk liability as
a manufacturer."8 This is a seemingly unprecedented requirement.
Section 2305.32(H) of Senate Bill No. 67 more closely comports with
the provision of section 114(b) of the uniform statutory proposal." A
justification for inclusion of these sections on seller liability was ex-
pressed in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,.. "[in some cases the retailer
may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the
injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a substan-
tial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to
exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end."8 It is apparent that
the Ohio legislation would expose the non-manufacturing seller to
greater liability than would the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law.
However, where the plaintiff would not be able to obtain sufficient
redress from the manufacturer, both statutory proposals would treat
the seller similarly.
The experience of other states regarding liability of a non-manufac-
turing seller has been varied. Although generally the retailer and dis-
tributor have a relatively small role as product liability defendants,
when compared to the product manufacturer, they are frequently in-
" S.B. No. 67, supra note 1 § 2305.32(A)-(E).
78 Id. § 2305.32(G).
Compare id § 2305.32(H) with Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, §
114,44 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 3,001 (1979). See appendices I and II.
'0 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). Additionally, the Draft
Uniform Product Liability Law provides, "[i]f the manufacturer is not subject to
service of process or has been judicially declared insolvent, or where a court
determines that the claimant would have appreciable difficulty in enforcing a
judgment against the product manufacturer, the retailer or distributor has the
same strict liability obligation as a manufacturer." 44 Fed. Reg. at 3,014.
11 61 Cal. 2d at 258, 391 P.2d at 170, 37 Cal. Rptr. ate99.
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eluded as defendants. 2 As a result, retailers and distributors are subject
to substantial product liability costs both in terms of insurance pre-
miums and legal defense costs incurred beyond the scope of insurance
coverage e.g., employee time, records production and loss prevention
techniques. The proposed Ohio legislation regarding liability of the
retailer will undoubtedly have a mitigating effect upon the costs sellers
must bear.
V. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOR SITUATIONS INVOLVING
MODIFICATION, DETERIORATION, OR ABUSE OF THE PRODUCT
83
Section 2305.33(A) of the proposed bill follows Ohio common law in ex-
empting the manufacturer from liability where modification, deteriora-
tion or abuse of the product creates the defect outside of his control.
Section 2305.33(A)(1) and (2) are similar to each other in that both in-
volve a change in the product between the time it left the factory of the
manufacturer and the time it caused the plaintiff's injury. The major dif-
ference between these sections is that in paragraph (1), the change in
the product was brought about by assertive action by someone other
than the manufacturer; and in paragraph (2) the change in the product
was the result of a lack of action to maintain the product properly by
someone other than the manufacturer. In either case the manufacturer
is not liable.
This statutory prescription closely comports with Ohio law in this
area of product liability. As illustrated in Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,84
where there has been a "substantial change" from the condition in
which the product was originally sold, manufacturers cannot be success-
fully sued for the injuries sustained.85
The rationale behind this rule is that the manufacturer should only be
held liable for the injuries caused by the defects which existed in the
product when it left his factory and not for injuries caused by defects
which resulted from changes made to the product after it was beyond the
manufacturer's control. The only variation added by section 2305.33(A) is
that such modifications cannot be "made by, at the direction of, or with
the express consent of, the party against whom recovery is sought.""8
Thus, unless the manufacturer was involved with the modifications, he
will be absolved of liability therefrom.
82 See, e.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1972); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963); Tuscon Indus.,
Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972).
See S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.33(A).
50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
Id. at 269. The product involved was a power press machine. The activating
buttons were relocated from shoulder height at the time of manufacture in 1954,
to waist height and in an upward position before the injury in 1972.
" S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.32(A)(1).
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Section 2305.33(A)(3) and (4) set out further actions by the plaintiff
which constitute defenses to the manufacturer's or seller's liability: use
of the product, with knowledge that is defective, contrary to reasonable
warnings or for other than the intended purposes;" and separately,
assumption of the risk by the plaintiff.8 The relationship between these
defenses and sections 110 and 111 of the Draft Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Law is noteworthy. Section 110 follows section 2305.33(A)(3) rather
closely, except that the Draft Law (section 110(A)(3)) charges the manu-
facturer with anticipation of modification of the product by a third
party, but only if the manufacturer has reasonable expectation that the
modification will take place. Section 111, however, differs from sections
2305.33(A)(3) and (4) in that the former assumes a comparative negli-
gence standard, whereby the amount of damages paid to plaintiff is re-
duced based upon an allocation of fault between plaintiff and defendant
causing plaintiff's injuries. The comparative negligence standard has
just recently been adopted in Ohio," and Senate Bill No. 67 may very
well be amended further to reflect this change in Ohio negligence law.
VI. STATE OF THE ART90 AND GOVERNMENT STANDARDS 91
Section 2305.33(B) represents a codification of the premise that a
product will be evaluated according to the technology in existence at
the time of its manufacture. The production techniques of one genera-
tion are not to be judged in the light of subsequent technology.
Ohio cases have generally viewed the state of the art defense as via-
ble when a product conforms to the date-of-production standards, while
refusing to consider a product defective per se merely because it does
not." However, the common law in other states does not permit it as a
defense in strict liability cases. Under Illinois law, for example, the term
"state of the art" has been held to have no relevance to defense of an ac-
tion for strict products liability. 3 In Texas, conformance to industry
87 See id. § 2305.33(A)(3).
88 See id. § 2305.33(A)(4).
8 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1980)(effective June 20,
1980).
" S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.33(B) deals with the state of the art defense.
1 S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 2305.34 deals with the government standards
defense.
82 See, e.g., LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App.2d 43, 355
N.E.2d 533 (1976)(subsequent changes in state of the art are not admissible to
show that the item is defective in action based on strict liability); Burkhard v.
Short, 28 Ohio App.2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971)(unpadded dashboard not
unreasonably dangerous when not shown to be unique or unusual in design from
all other automobile manufacturers).
" Waler v. Trico Mfg. Co., Inc., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 978 (1974).
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custom is admissible on the question of negligence of the manufacturer,
but the custom itself may be shown to be negligent."
Permitting an action to be maintained for injuries sustained from a
product whose design is evaluated by standards which evolved after
that particular product's manufacture places upon the defendant an
almost insuperable burden. This section of Senate Bill No. 67 attempts
to evenly allocate the burden between plaintiff and defendant.
The codification of the state of the art defense will curb some abuses
in the product liability field. It provides some defense against strict lia-
bility standards concerning product risks that are unknown at the time
particular products are placed into commerce. Even with the proposed
statute of limitations, the spectacular growth of technology could result
in significant technological differences in manufacturing standards after
only a few years.
Furthermore, the state of the art defense does not preclude a defend-
ant from relying upon any other defense, such as assumption of a risk.
Including this defense may serve to encourage manufacturers to be
more innovative in the design and production of their goods in order to
reduce the number of product related injuries and subsequent actions.
The proposed state of the art defense, however, is not absolute. It
creates only the rebuttable presumption that the product was not defec-
tive, and still affords the plaintiff an opportunity to overcome "the
burden of goingoforward with evidence to rebut or meet the presump-
tion."9 9 This has the effect of requiring plaintiff to prove that the prod-
uct was defective, a very difficult task in strict liability suits particularly
when the product was made in accordance with technological standards
that are now obsolete.
Thus the result of this rebuttable presumption is to require plaintiff
to prove his case rather than resting it on the mere premise that an in-
jury occurred from an allegedly defective product. This concept is also
reflected in the Draft Uniform Liability Law. 7
The defense of compliance with government standards, which is also
treated as a rebuttable presumption in the statutory proposal, would
place the same evidentiary burdens on the plaintiff as would the rebut-
' Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
9 FED. R. EVID. 301.
Additionally, claims based on res ipsa loquitor-the mere fact that the in-
jury occurred from a product which when made was under defendant's control
establishes defendant's liability-would also seem to be affected by the state of
the art defense. When the defect complained of was due to a method of design or
manufacture typical at the time the product was made, the plaintiff would still
have to meet evidence to rebut the presumption that the product was not defec-
tive. Thus, the plaintiff would not be able to rest his case on res ipsa loquitor
alone.
" See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 2,998
(1979).
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table presumption of manufacture in accordance with the state of the
art. There is ample justification for such a defense. There are many
government agencies which are establishing safety standards. 8 It is
logical to conclude that compliance with standards set by government
experts should be a defense to an action based on strict liability. This
would still leave the plaintiff with an action based on negligence as evi-
denced by failure to comply with the government standards (as it would
if defendant failed to establish compliance with state of the art stan-
dards). But if the product met these standards, the strict liability issue
may not reach the jury, unless evidence was introduced that the stan-
dards were defective."
Many courts accept the idea that compliance with government stan-
dards, while usually precluding strict liability, would still permit an action
based on negligence. 0 This view is also reflected by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts which provides that "[c]ompliance with a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of
negligence where a reasonable man would take additional
precautions.'"'0 1
The status to be given the defense of compliance with government
standards raises an additional point of contention. For example, in Tem-
ple the Ohio Supreme Court considered the defense of compliance with
government standards to negate negligence as a matter of law.0 2 One
noted commentator interpreted this opinion to reasonably infer that
"use of the industrial standard to negate negligence as a matter of law
will carry over to the determination of the existence of a defect in a
product for strict liability standards."'0 3 However, it was also noted that
9 E.g., consumer products are regulated under the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1972); motor vehicles and related equipment are
regulated under the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-431
(1966); drugs are regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1938).
See, e.g., Hoenig, Compliance with Government Standards, 178 N.Y.L.J. 2
(1977), at 2, cols. 1-2. It is emphasized that merely introducing some evidence that
the government standards were defective is insufficient; the plaintiff should be re-
quired to show that the standards were based on inaccurate, incomplete,
misleading or fraudulent information.
'oo See, e.g., McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d
822 (1976) (acceptance of Food and Drug Administration standards as persuasive
evidence that product is not unreasonably dangerous in the absence of proof of in-
accurate information furnished by manufacturer in meeting such standards);
Gilbride v. James Leffel & Co., 37 Ohio L. Abs. 457, 47 N.E.2d 1015 (2d Dist. 1942)
(state inspection of boiler does not relieve manufacturer of boiler from liability
for negligent construction thereof, as the negligent construction may have been
overlooked by the state inspector).
10' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 288C (1965).
'02 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267, 273 (1977).
"' Werber, Strict Liability Comes of Age in Ohio: Almost, 11 AKRON L. REV.
679, 688 (1978).
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some government standard legislation includes the provision "that it is
not intended to be in derogation of the common law, as is the case with
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966."' 04 Addition-
ally many courts view government standards not to be a defense as a
matter of law, but only as an example of minimum requirements which
would not serve as a legal defense but only as some evidence of due
care. A finding of negligence is still permissible in spite of compliance
with such standards."5 Senate Bill No. 67, by establishing the rebuttable
presumption that the product was not defective if made in compliance
with government standards, appears to represent a middle ground be-
tween-treating the defense as absolute and regarding it as insignificant.
It is apparent that the defenses of compliance with government stan-
dards and state of the art are treated similarly in Ohio's proposed prod-
uct liability reform legislation. Furthermore, the government standards
provision of section 2305.34 is similar in the treatment accorded the
rebuttable presumption of the product's safety to that in section 107 of
the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, although the latter sets
stricter guidelines in defining a "government standard" than does the
Ohio legislation.'
The relationship between these two statutory defenses deserves a
brief comment. While a product will be presumed to be free from defect
if made in accordance with government standards and defective if not so
made; and a product will be presumed to be safe if made according to
the state of the art at the time of its manufacture, there is no alterna-
tive provision that the product would be considered defective if not
made according to the state of the art at the time of its manufacture.' 7
In other words, the plaintiff would theoretically be able to use the
government standards provision to shift the burden to the defendant of
going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption that the product
was defective if it is shown that it did not meet applicable government
standards when it was made. However, showing that the product did
not meet the state of the art when it was made will not create a statu-
tory presumption which will operate in the plaintiff's favor. Apparently,
the reason for this different treatment is that it is assumed that govern-
ment standards will always be either equal to or less than the state of
the art standards, but never greater; and that it would be possible for a
104 Id. at 688. "15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1410 (1970). Section 108(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1397(c), expressly negatives any intention of Congress to preempt this field and
leaves common law development intact." Id. at 688, n.38.
" See, e.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976); Pickering v.
State, 57 Hawaii 405, 557 P.2d 125 (1976); Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan.
627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976).
' See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, § 107,44 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 2,999
(1979). See appendix I.
" See notes 90 and 91 supra.
19801
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
product to meet government safety requirements and yet fail to meet
the state of the art at the time of the product's manufacture. In this
situation the Ohio Senate apparently wanted to avoid the incongruous
result of a product being presumed defective because it met govern-
ment safety requirements at the time of its manufacture.
VII. CONSIDERATION OF INSURANCE COSTS FOR
PRODUCT LIABILITY COVERAGE' °8
Insurance companies generally support Senate Bill No. 67 because
one of its primary purposes is to make liability insurance coverage more
available. Additionally, the shared concern over the cost of insurance is
manifest in the proposed legislation.
Beginning January 1, 1981, the bill would require every insurance
company to "base its product liability insurance rates in this state on
past and prospective loss experience in the state to the extent that the
insured's exposure is in the state."'' 9 The term "exposure" is not defined
in the bill, but it appears to reflect the idea that insurance companies
should not have nationally uniform rates and that Ohio should reap the
benefits of its legislation meant to curb these rates.
Current law requires insurance companies doing business in Ohio to
file annual reports with the Superintendent of Insurance."' The bill
would require any company that issues product liability insurance poli-
cies in Ohio to file an additional annual report with the superintendent,
in order that more detailed information may be obtained on the product
liability lines offered by these companies.' This will in turn enable the
legislature to ascertain the effects of the new product liability law on
the insurance rates it was intended to reduce. The proposed legislation
also defines product liability insurance."' Furthermore, the Ohio Prod-
ucts Liability Study Commission would be created to evaluate the ef-
fects of Senate Bill No. 67 on product liability law and insurance and to
report its findings to the legislature."' These sections will give the
burgeoning field of products liability far more attention than it has been
accorded in the past and afford Ohio the opportunity to evaluate the
performance of its product liability reform legislation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill No. 67 is a comprehensive proposal which, if enacted, will
have a substantial impact on Ohio product liability law. Whereas its
1' See S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, §§ 3929.301, 3929.32 and 3937.021.
'0 Id. § 3937.021.
"1 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.30 (Page 1971).
" S.B. No. 67, supra note 1, § 3937.021(H).
"'Id. § 3929.301(C).
"1 Id § 3929.021 (Section 4).
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most controversial aspect is the outside "date-of-sale" statute of limita-
tions, its codification of certain defenses for manufacturers and sellers,
including those of state of the art and compliance with government stan-
dards, as well as provisions for study of the legislation's effects on
subsequent lawsuits and changes in insurance rates, promises to affect
product liability law and insurance in Ohio for a long time to come.
Although the statute of limitations will not affect many Ohio product
liability actions because most are filed within ten years from the prod-
uct's initial date of sale, it may nevertheless influence product liability
insurance rates based upon what the insurance industry perceives as be-
ing portentious in product liability claims. If constitutionally challenged,
the outside date-of-sales statute of limitations will likely be upheld.
The codification of various defenses is basically in accordance with
the present common law of Ohio. Some possible exceptions are sections
2305.33(A)(3) and (4) which appear to provide the final step in Ohio's
evolution from the defense of contributory negligence to strict liability
requiring more culpable conduct on the part of a plaintiff to prevent
recovery.
The proposed legislation monitors the effects it will have on the insur-
ance industry and provides a vehicle-the Ohio Products Liability
Study Commission -through which further reform of product liability
law in Ohio may be effectuated. Senate Bill No. 67 is not the final word
in Ohio product liability law, but it is a significant first step. It reflects
the first response to a recognized need for reform called by attorneys,
manufacturers, legal commentators, and the insurance industry. While
not flawless, it will help balance the burdens of plaintiff and defendant.
The proposed legislation may provide a net societal benefit by more
realistically regulating the conduct of product liability actions and by
making product liability insurance coverage more readily available at
reasonable rates.
GEORGE D. ROSCOE
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APPENDIX I
S.B. No. 67, 113th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1979-80)
as passed by the Ohio Senate.
A BILL
To amend section 3929.32 and to enact sections 2305.101, 2305.32,
2305.33, 2305.34, 3929.301, and 3937.021 of the Revised Code to impose
on product liability actions a statute of limitations related to the time of
initial sale of the product, to make certain defenses available in all prod-
uct liability cases, to establish rebuttable presumptions in the case of
either compliance or noncompliance with manufacturing standards, to
limit the liability of sellers of allegedly defective products, to require in-
surance companies writing product liability insurance policies to report
annually certain information relative to such policies to the Superinten-
dent of Insurance, and to require insurers to base their product liability
insurance rates in this state on experience in this state.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio:
Section 1. That section 3929.32 be amended and sections 2305.101,
2305.32, 2305.33, 2305.34, 3929.301, and 3937.021 of the Revised Code be
enacted to read as follows:
Sec. 2305.101. (A) An action for bodily injury, death, or injury to per-
sonal or real property caused by a defective product shall be brought
within two years after the cause thereof arose, but in no event more
than ten years from the date the product was first sold or leased for use
or consumption if the cause of action is based upon strict tort liability or
implied warranty except as otherwise provided in this section. If the
manufacturer of a defective product, at the time such defective product
was manufactured, had actual knowledge of the defect and that such
defect is likely to cause harm in the ordinary course of the use of the
product, then the ten-year limitation set forth in this section shall not
apply to an action for bodily injury, death, or injury to personal or real
property resulting from such defect. Neither shall the ten-year limita-
tion apply to any such action or cause resulting from exposure to toxic
substances.
(B) Nothing contained in this section affects the right of any person
found liable to seek and obtain indemnity from any other person.
Sec. 2305.32. No action in tort for bodily injury, death, or injury to
real or personal property shall be maintained against any seller of a
product that is alleged to have contained or possessed a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless any
of the following apply:
(A) The seller is the manufacturer of the product or of the part
thereof claimed to be defective;
(B) The seller is owned in whole or in significant part by the manu-
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facturer of the product, or owns in whole or in significant part the manu-
facturer of the product;
(C) The seller markets the product under its private label or trade-
mark;
(D) The seller has actual knowledge of the alleged defect or, based
on facts available to him, should have had knowledge of the defect prior
to sale;
(E) The seller creates or furnishes a manufacturer with a design for
producing the product in which such design is the proximate cause of
the defect;
(F) The seller alters, modifies, or fails to maintain a product after
the product comes into his possession and before it leaves his posses-
sion, and the alteration, modification, or failure to maintain the product
renders the product defective;
(G) The seller, upon receipt of a written request, fails to provide in
writing to any person within twenty days of receipt, the name and ad-
dress of the manufacturer of the alleged defective product which has
been or is currently being offered for sale by the seller and which is the
basis for the injury.
(H) The manufacturer or importer of the alleged defective product
has no agent within the United States subject to service of process, or
has insufficient property within the United States subject to judicial
process. However, nothing contained in this division shall prevent a
plaintiff who has obtained a final judgment against a foreign manufac-
turer or importer from later refiling a suit against the seller to collect
the balance of the judgment if the foreign manufacturer or importer has
insufficient property or insurance in the United States to satisfy that
judgment.
Nothing contained in this section is applicable to any action for bodily
injury, death, or injury to real or personal property based upon negli-
gence, express warranty, or contract.
Sec. 2305.33. (A) The manufacturer or seller of a defective product
shall not be held liable for the cause of any bodily injury, death, or in-
jury to real or personal property produced by the following, which con-
stitute defenses:
(1) An alteration, modification, or change in the product that was not
made by, at the direction of, or with the express consent of, the party
against whom recovery is sought;
(2) Deterioration of the product by reason of the failure of a product
owner or user properly and reasonably to maintain, service, or repair
the product in accordance with the manufacturer's written warnings;
(3) Abuse of the product by the plaintiff:
(a) With knowledge that it is defective;
(b) In a manner contrary to reasonable warnings delivered to the
plaintiff;
(c) For other than the purposes for which it is designed, or intended,
or foreseeably used.
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(4) The assumption of the risk by the plaintiff.
(B) It shall be rebuttably presumed that a product was not defective
as manufactured if the design of the product or the method of its manu-
facture or testing or inspection which is alleged to have caused the bod-
ily injury, death, or injury to personal or real property conformed with
the state of the art existing at the time the product was designed, manu-
factured, tested, or inspected. For purposes of this division, "state of
the art" means the technical, mechanical, scientific, and safety knowl-
edge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time the prod-
uct was designed, manufactured, tested, or inspected.
Sec. 2305.34. (A) In any action for bodily injury, death or injury to real
or personal property caused by a product, evidence that such product,
at the time of its manufacture, complied with applicable statutes, stan-
dards, and rules of the federal government and of this state regarding
product design, manufacture, or testing creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that the product, in any respect that is relevant to the action and as
to which there was compliance with such applicable statutes, standards,
and rules, was not defective.
(B) In any action for bodily injury, death or injury to real or personal
property caused by a product, evidence that the product, at the time of
its manufacture, did not comply with applicable statutes, standards, and
rules of the federal government or of this state regarding product
design, manufacture, or testing creates a rebuttable presumption that
the product, in any respect that is relevant to the action and as to which
there was not compliance with such applicable statutes, standards, and
rules, was defective.
Sec. 3929.301. (A) The president or the vice-president and the secre-
tary, of each insurance company doing business in this state that issues
product liability insurance policies, shall, in addition to the report re-
quired by section 3929.30 of the Revised Code, prepare under oath, a
statement of the following facts and items, as of the preceding thirty-
first day of December, in the following form:
(1) The name of the insurance company;
(2) The name of all other companies associated with the company
submitting the report, either as a holding company, parent, sub-
sidiary, division, or through interlocking directorates;
(3) The states in which the company is doing the business of prod-
uct liability insurance;
(4) The total premium dollar amount collected for all lines of insur-
ance in this state and in all states in each of the three years pre-
ceding the initial report and in the years preceding the filing of
each annual report thereafter;
(5) The dollar amount collected in product liability insurance pre-
miums in this state and in all states beginning with calendar
year 1978;
(6) The amount in dollars of product liability insurance premiums
[Vol. 29:141
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss1/25
1980] PROPOSED PRODUCT LIABILITY STATUTE 171
collected for primary coverage and for excess coverage in this
state and in all states;
(7) Whether the company sets reserves for product liability claims
for losses that have been incurred but not reported;
(8) All reserves established in connection with the company's prod-
uct liability line;
(9) The treatment of dollars reserved under each of the categories
listed in division (A) (7) and (8) of this section, for federal income
tax purposes;
(10) The number of claims or actions in this state for damages be-
cause of injury, death, or property damage claimed to have been
caused by or to have resulted from the use of a product de-
signed, manufactured, distributed, or sold by an insured of the
company that were filed against such insured in the previous
ten-year period, for the initial report, and for the year preceding
the filing of each annual report thereafter, with each claim to be
identified by:
(a) The name and address of the insured;
(b) The type of product involved in the claim and the date the
product was first purchased for use or consumption;
(c) The rating classification code of product liability coverage,
if any;
(d) The policy number of the insured;
(e) The date the claim arose and the state or other jurisdiction
in which the claim was adjudicated, settled, or otherwise
disposed of .. .;
(f) The date the claim or action was filed, the court in which it
was filed and the docket or case number assigned, if the
claim was filed in a court action;
(g) A summary of the occurrence out of which the claim or ac-
tion arose;
(h) The status of the claim or action, and the amount of pay-
ment made on the claim or action.
(B) The report required under division (A) of this section shall be
deposited on the first day of January of each year or within sixty days
thereafter, in the office of the superintendent of insurance.
(C) As used in this section, "product liability insurance" includes any
insurance, provided pursuant to policy or contract, that insures a person
against loss or damage resulting from accident to, or injury or death suf-
fered by, a person, or injury to real or personal property, that was
caused by or resulted from the use of a product designed, manufactured,
distributed, or sold by the insured.
Sec. 3929. No company organized under a law of this state shall fail
to make and deposit any statement required by sections 3929.30 and
3929.31, or section 3929.301 of the Revised Code, or to reply to an in-
quiry of the superintendent of insurance with respect to the statement.
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Whoever violates this section shall be subject to a forfeiture of five
hundred dollars, and an additional five hundred dollars for every month
it thereafter continues to transact any business of insurance, to be re-
covered by action in the name of the state, and, on collection, paid into
the state treasury.
Sec. 3937.021. Beginning on January 1, 1981, every insurer shall
base its product liability insurance rates in this state on past and pros-
pective loss experience in this state to the extent that the insured's ex-
posure is in this state.
Section 2. That existing section 3929.32 of the Revised Code is
hereby repealed.
Section 3. Section 2305.101 of the Revised Code as enacted by this
act shall take effect at the earliest time permitted by law, except that
any cause of action that has arisen through the occurrence of an injury
before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the amend-
ment of that section.
Section 4. (A) There is hereby created for a period ending two years
after the effective date of this act; the Ohio Products Liability Study
Commission consisting of six members, three of whom shall be ap-
pointed from the membership of the Senate by the President of the
Senate, not more than two of which shall be of the same political party,
and three of whom shall be appointed from the membership of the
House of Representatives by the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, not more than two of which shall be of the same political party.
(B) The Commission shall:
(1) Study the effects of this act;
(2) Investigate the problems posed by products liability and the
issues surrounding it;
(3) Collect data and statistics to assist in its study;
(4) Transmit a report of its findings, with any recommenda-
tions, to the members of the General Assembly not later
than two years after the effective date of this act.
(C) Any vacancy in the membership of the Commission shall be filled
in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.
(D) The members of the Commission shall by majority vote elect a
chairman from among themselves.
(E) Each member of the Commission shall be reimbursed for ex-
penses actually and necessarily incurred in the performance of his
duties.
(F) The Commission is authorized to reimburse consultants it may
engage for their expenses actually and necessarily incurred.
(G) The Legislative Service Commission shall provide such technical,
professional, and clerical employees as are necessary for the Commis-
sion to carry out its duties.
(H) During the existence of the Ohio Product Liability Study Com-
mission a copy of each report required by section 3929.301 of the Re-
vised Code shall be filed with the Commission.
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APPENDIX II
Selected portions of the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed.
Reg. 2,996 (1979) are produced below for the convenience of the reader.
Section 106. Relevance of the "State of the Art" and Industry Cus-
tom
(a) For the purposes of this section, "state of the art" means the
safety, technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge in existence and
reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture.
(b) Evidence of changes in a product design, in the "state of the art,"
or in the custom of the product seller's industry occurring after the
product was manufactured is not admissible for the purpose of proving
that the product was defective in design under Section 104(B), or that a
warning or instruction should have accompanied the product at the time
of manufacture under Section 104(C). The evidence may be admitted for
other purposes if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
(c) Evidence of custom in the product seller's industry is generally
admissible. The product seller's compliance or non-compliance with cus-
tom may be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a
product was defective in design under Section 104(C), or whether there
was a failure to warn or instruct adequately under Section 104(C).
(d) Evidence that a product conformed to the "state of the art" at
the time of manufacture, raises a presumption that the product was not
defective within the meaning of Sections 104(B) and (C). This presump-
tion may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that in light of
the factors set forth in Sections 104(B) and (C), the product was defec-
tive.
(e) A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to a non-
governmental safety standard having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed through careful, thorough product testing
and a formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered
in formulating the standard;
(3) It was considered more than a minimum safety standard at
the time of its development; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and
scientific knowledge reasonably available at the time the
product was manufactured.
If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative, it shall in-
struct the trier of fact to presume that the product was not defective.
This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
that in light of the factors set forth in Sections 104(B) and (C), the prod-
uct was defective.
Section 107. Relevance of Compliance with Legislative or Adminis-
trative Standards.
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(a) A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to an ad-
ministrative or legislative standard having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed as a result of careful, thorough product
testing and a formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered
in formulating the standard;
(3) The agency responsible for enforcement of the standard con-
sidered it to be more than a minimum safety standard at the
time of its promulgation; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and
scientific knowledge reasonably available at the time the
product was manufactured.
(b) If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative, it
shall instruct the trier of fact to presume that the product was not de-
fective. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evi-
dence that in light of the factors set forth in Section 104(B) and (C), the
product was defective.
Section 109. Length of Time Product Sellers are Subject to Liability
for Harm Caused by Their Products.
(A) Useful Safe Life.
(1) A product seller may be liable to a claimant for harm caused by
the seller's product during the useful safe life of that product. "Useful
safe life" refers to the time during which the product reasonably can be
expected to perform in a safe manner. In determining whether a prod-
uct's useful safe life has expired, the trier of fact may consider:
(a) The effect on the product of wear and tear or deterioration
from natural causes;
(b) The effect of climactic and other local conditions in which the
product was used;
(c) The policy of the user and similar users as to repairs, re-
newals and replacements;
(d) Representations, instructions and warnings made by the
product seller about the product's useful safe life; and
(e) Any modification or alteration of the product by a user or
third party.
(2) A product seller shall not be liable for injuries or damage caused
by a product beyond its useful safe life unless the seller has so expressly
warranted.
(B) Statutes of Repose.
(1) Workplace Injuries.
(a) A claimant entitled to compensation under a state worker
compensation statute may bring a product liability claim
under this Act for harm that occurs within ten (10) years
after delivery of the completed product to its first purchaser
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or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling
products of that type.
(b) Where this Act precludes a worker from bringing a claim be-
cause of subdivision (1)(a), but the worker can prove, by the
preponderance of evidence, that the product causing the in-
jury was unsafe, the worker may bring a claim against the
workplace employer. If possible, the claim should be brought
in a worker compensation proceeding, and shall include all
loss of wages that otherwise would not be compensated
under the applicable worker compensation statute.
(c) Where this Act precludes a worker's beneficiaries under an
applicable wrongful death statute from bringing a wrongful
death claim because of subdivision (1)(a), but they can prove,
by a preponderance of evidence, that the product that caused
the worker's death was unsafe, they may bring a claim
against the workplace employer. If possible, the claim must
be brought in a Worker Compensation proceeding, and shall
include pecuniary losses that would not have otherwise been
compensated under the applicable worker compensation stat-
ute.
(d) An employer who is subject to liability under either subsec-
tion (1)(b) or (c) shall have the right to seek contribution from
the product seller in an arbitration proceeding under Section
116 of this Act. Contribution shall be limited to the extent
that the product seller is responsible for the harm incurred
under the principles of Section 104 of this Act. The final
judgment in that proceeding shall not be subject to trial de
novo, but shall be treated as a final judgment of a trial court.
(2) Non-Workplace Injuries.
For product liability claims not included in subdivision (B) that in-
volve harms occurring more than ten (10) years after delivery of the
completed product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged
in the business of selling products of that type, the presumption is that
the product has been utilized beyond its useful safe life as established
by subdivision (A). This presumption may be rebutted by clear and con-
vincing evidence.
(3) Limitations on Statutes of Repose.
(a) Where a product seller expressly warrants or promises that
the seller's product can be utilized safely for a period longer
than ten (10) years, the period of repose shall be extended ac-
cording to these warranties or promises.
(b) The ten (10) year period of repose, established in Section
109(B) does not apply if the product seller intentionally mis-
represents a product, or fraudulently conceals information
about it, where that conduct was a substantial cause of the
claimant's harm.
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(c) Nothing contained in Section 109(B) shall affect the right of
any person found liable under this Act to seek and obtain
contribution or indemnity from any other person who is re-
sponsible for harm under this Act.
(d) The ten (10) year period of repose established in Section
109(B) does not apply if the harm was caused by prolonged
exposure to a defective product, or if an injury-causing
aspect of the product existing at the time it was sold did not
manifest itself until ten years after the time of its first use.
(C) Statute of Limitations.
All claims under this Act shall be brought within three years of the
time the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should
have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim.
Section 110. Relevance of Third-Party Alteration or Modification of
a Product.
(a) A product seller shall not be liable for harm that would not have
occurred but for the fact that his product was altered or modified by a
third party unless:
(1) The alteration or modification was in accordance with the
product seller's instructions or specifications;
(2) The alteration or modification was made with the express
consent of the product seller; or
(3) The alteration or modification was the result of conduct that
reasonably should have been anticipated by the product
seller.
(b) For the purposes of this section, alteration or modification in-
cludes changes in the design, formula, function, or use of the product
from that originally designed, tested or intended by the product seller.
It includes failure to observe routine care and maintenance, but does
not include ordinary wear and tear.
Section 111. Relevance of Conduct on the Part of Product Liability
Claimants.
(a) General Rule.
In any claim under this Act, the comparative responsibility of, or at-
tributed to, the claimant, shall not bar recovery but shall diminish the
award of compensatory damages proportionately, according to the
measure of responsibility attributed to the claimant.
(b) Apportionment of Damages.
In any claim involving comparative responsibility, the court, unless
otherwise requested by all parties, shall instruct the jury to give
answers to special interrogatories, or the court shall make its own find-
ings if there is no jury, indicating-
(1) The amount of damages each claimant would have received if
comparative responsibility were disregarded, and
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(2) The percentage of responsibility allocated to each party, in-
cluding the claimant, as compared with the combined respon-
sibility of all parties to the action. For the purpose, the court
may decide that it is appropriate to treat two or more per-
sons as a single party.
(3) In determining the percentage of responsibility, the trier of
fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both the nature
and quality of the conduct of the party.
(4) The court shall determine the award for each claimant ac-
cording to these findings and shall enter judgment against
parties liable on the basis of the common law joint and sev-
eral liability of joint tortfeasors. The judgment shall also
specify the proportionate amount of damages allocated
against each party liable, according to the percentage of
responsibility established for that party.
(5) Upon a motion made not later than one year after judgment
is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a
party's share of the obligation is uncollectible from that
party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among
the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to
their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability
is reallocated is still to be subject to contribution and to any
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
(c) Conduct Affecting Claimant's Responsibility.
(1) Failure to Discover a Defective Condition.
(i) A claimant is not required to have inspected the product
for defective condition. Failure to have done so does not
render the claimant responsible for the harm caused.
(ii) Where a claimant using a product is injured by a defec-
tive condition that would have been apparent to an ordi-
nary prudent person, the claimant's damages are subject
to reduction according to the principles of subsections
(a) and (b).
(2) Using a Product with a Known Defective Condition.
(i) A claimant who knew about a product's defective condi-
tion, but who voluntarily and unreasonably used the
product, shall be held solely responsible for injuries
caused by that defective condition.
(ii) In circumstances where a claimant knew about a prod-
uct's defective condition and voluntarily used the prod-
uct, but where the reasonableness of doing so was uncer-
tain, claimant's damages shall be subject to reduction
according to the principles of subsections (a) and (b).
(3) Misuse of a Product.
(i) Where a claimant has misused a product by using it in a
manner that the product seller could not have reason-
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ably anticipated, the claimant's damages shall be re-
duced according to the principles of subsections (a) and
(b).
(ii) Where the injury would not have occurred but for the
misuse defined in subsection (3)(i), the product is not
defective for purposes of liability under this Act.
Section 114. The Individual Responsibility of Product Sellers other
than Manufacturers as Compared to other Product Sellers.
(a) Manufacturers shall be responsible for defective conditions in
their products according to the provisions of this Act. In the absence of
express warrantees [sic] to the contrary, other product sellers shall not
be subject to liability in circumstances where they do not have a
reasonable opportunity to inspect the product in a manner which would
or should, in the exercise of reasonable care, reveal the existence of the
defective condition.
(b) The duty limitation of subsection (a) shall not apply, however, if:
(1) The manufacturer is not subject to service of process in the
claimant's own state;
(2) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent;
(3) The court determines that the claimant would have appreci-
able difficulty enforcing a judgment against the product
manufacturer.
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